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Lawyer Malpractice: Duty Relationships
Beyond Contract
W. Probert* and R. Hendricks**
I. Introduction
Until recently, the lawyer's enterprise had remained virtually an island in
negligence law. Traditionally, lawyers were largely immune from non-client
claims short of fraud or collusion. Because of the protective barrier of privity of
contract, their liability for negligence ran only to clients.' Although the courts
historically used privity to insulate all manner of activities, the concept has had
a special appeal and lasting quality in the area of lawyer malpractice.
Understandably, the judiciary has tended to reflect the general professional at-
titude that a lawyer should be concerned mainly, if not only, with his client's
interest.
Even so, it now appears that most states will come to reject privity as an
absolute requirement. 2 Although this development may disturb some members
of the profession, there is no real cause for alarm. Significant limits on respon-
sibility will remain, the range of liability varying among the states. We will ex-
plore the development in some detail, including the background and current
context. The trend is part of a larger picture, being affected by tort law general-
ly and having a substantial impact in return. Of especial interest are the inter-
relationships of the trend with the areas of negligent misrepresentation and of
negligent interference with purely economic interests. 3 After exploring these
various currents, we will attend closely and analytically to the relevant case law
to chart the development of duty beyond contract. Such analysis is particularly
desirable in this area because of the subtleties ofjudicial control and discretion
Professor of Law, University of Florida; B.S., J.D., Oregon; J.S.D., Yale.
B.A., M.A., Emory University; J.D., University of Florida.
I The leading case is Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879), in which the lawyer for the bor-
rower owed no duty to the lender regarding certificate of title, citing Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep.
402 (Ex. 1842) (the leading case requiring privity of contract to support the duty of due care in contractually
involved enterprises). But cf. Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 A. .98 (1897) (imposing duty on lawyer for
borrower for undertaking to provide abstract of title to lender, using both tort and contract theory).
2 A duty of due care to a beneficiary not in privity was imposed on a lawyer in a will-drafting situation,
Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962),
the contemporary leading case.
3 An early comment of note in this area is Isaacs, Liability of the Lawyer for BadAdvice, 24 CAL. L. REv.
39 (1935), declaring the inhibitions of contract theory inadequate to the twentieth century; But cf. Keeton,
Professional Malpractice, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 445 (1978) (favoring the retention of contract limits, except in the
Lucas kind of situation and for misrepresentation. Lucas and its progeny have stimulated considerable
response, largely limited in scope). See, e.g., R. MALLtN & V. LEvsT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, 59 54-59 (1977);
Freeman, Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973 DUKE L.J. 371, 379-87; BELDEN, BELDEN & LAPPAS, Profes-
sional Liability of Lawyers in Pennsylvania, 10 DuQ. L. REv. 317, 333-37 (1972); Averill, Attorney's Liability for
Negligent Malpractice, 2 LAND & WATER L. REv. 379, 384-400 (1967); Comment, Legal Liability of the Profes-
sional Tax Practitioner, 20 EMORY L. REv. 403, 411-17 (1977); see also Martindale, Attorney's Liability in Non-
Client and Foreign Law Situations, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 44, 46-51 (1965); Wade, The Attorney's Liability for
Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REv. 755 (1959); Note, 81 L. Q. REv. 465, 478 (1965). Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1181
(1972) (often cited in the cases).
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involved in decisions on duty, especially in the definition of the scope of duty in
various situations.
In our final consideration, we explore and project the present trend, sug-
gesting that ultimately lawyers' responsibility will be keyed to the relationships
they enter, whether contractual or not.
II. The Evolution of a New Approach
The decline of privity in this area does not import the ascendancy of
foreseeabiity as a prime criterion of duty.4 Such accountability would burden
lawyers far too heavily, reaching even into the day-to-day business of client
counseling and otherwise routine matters. The evolution of negligence theory
well demonstrates that neither extreme is necessary. Foreseeability is the major
criterion of duty in most areas involving risk of physical harm. However, in
general there is no duty to use due care to prevent damage which is purely
economic. There are growing exceptions, for example in certain instances of
misrepresentation and in some lawyer relationships with non-clients. The ex-
ceptions do not threaten to undermine the general principle of non-duty in the
economic context nor do they measure duty only in terms of foreseeabiity. s
Therefore, privity and contract are no longer necessary in these areas.
Privity was historically significant in providing insulation to all sorts of ac-
tors against the economic risks of lawsuits for even physical harms. 6 As judicial
perspectives changed, however, manufacturing came to be regarded as the ap-
propriate enterprise to manage the economics of product distribution and, con-
sequently, product safety. 7 The development has been similar with activities
previously insulated by notions of privity and contract.8 The policy now is to
allow third party claims to be burdensome, at least to the point of discouraging
the production of bodily harm. When it comes to risks of purely economic
harm, the considerations are different and more complex.9 The privity barrier
might seem appropriate in contractual relationships where there is no risk of
physical harm, such as that of lawyer and client. The privity device allows such
actors to manage their risks, leaving the rest to the marketplace. 10 Yet
automobile driving is one example of a number of activities which is insulated
from liability for purely economic harm without the need of a privity barrier. If
4 The statements of this paragraph are elaborated in various portions of the subsequent text.
5 While lawyer duty to non-clients has independent importance, its greater significance may well turn
out to be as a testing ground along with cases involving negligent misrepresentation for expansion of the du-
ty to prevent or compensate for economic harm. See notes 13-18 and accompanying text infra.
6 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAw OFTORTS, 59 18.3, 18.5, chs. 27-29 (1956 & Supp. 1968); W. PROSSER,
The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED Topics ON THE LAw OF TORTS 380 (1954).
7 Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel: Strict Liability to the Consumer, 50 MINN. L. Rzv. 791 (1966); Wade, Strict
Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw.L.J. 5 (1965).
8 See, e.g., HARPER &JAMES, supra note 6, at 1042-43, 1506-16, Supp. at 74, 199-202.
9 James, Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAN . L.
REv. 43 (1972); Note, Negligent Interference with Contract: Knowledge as a Standard for Recovery, 63 VA. L. REv.
813 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 766C, Comment c (1979). The distinction is well marked in
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), holding a purchaser's claim
for loss of profits stemming from a defective truck to be limited to the remedies provided by the Uniform
Commercial Code.
10 See, Keeton, supra note 3, at 445-47; Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 979, 982-87 (1972), regarding accoun-
tants; Note, Public Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence and Third Parties, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 588,
602-07 (1972).
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a driver negligently causes a destructive fire in a store, he is responsible to the
owner but not to the clerk for his loss of wages."5 It is believed to be a
dangerous precedent not only for automobile driving but for practically all ac-
tivities to open the floodgates to a seemingly endless stream of liability for
economic losses suffered by employees, customers, suppliers, and so on. "The
law does not spread its protection" to the clerk so that it will not have to spread
it unreasonably far.
12
Thus, there are two potential barriers: privity and no duty to prevent
"remote" and purely economic harm. These two barriers can be confusingly
perceived. 13 Consider for illustration the leading case on lawyer duty to non-
clients, Lucas v. Hamm. 14 There, the court noted that, as a general rule, a duty
of due care is owed to the person the testator-client intended to name as
beneficiary, setting the precedent that a lawyer will be liable if he negligently
drafts a void devise.1 5 Such a specific duty can hardly be said to be an undue
burden on will-drafting lawyers. The beneficiary's only feasible remedy is
against the lawyer, and this sort of negligence or incompetence should not go
undeterred. There could be apprehension, however, that the precedent could
not be suitably confined. The crack in the door could open wide to excessive
claims that would unduly burden the legal profession-or threaten all activities
with "remote" economic damages.16 Yet, unless lawyers are a specially
privileged class, 17 it seems that the question of burden on the legal profession is
part of the larger question of duty. On the other hand, if it can be maintained
that there is no undue threat to the legal profession, the precedent marks the
beginning of an exception to the general principle regarding economic
damages. Therefore, the question is, at least in part, whether there should be
such an exception.18
11 Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio App. 1946); Adams v. Southern Pac. Transp.
Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 37, 123 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1975), both involving denial of claims for lost wages stemming
from explosions.
12 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), is the leading case denying liability for
negligently causing economic harm, here the loss of the use of a ship, criticized in James, supra note 9, at 56.
13 The cases which continue to cite the historical opinion of Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195
(1879), fail to note its dependence on the economic assumptions of Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep.
402 (Ex. 1842). But see Roscoe Pound's finding that the life span of a precedent is one generation, in Pound,
Survey of the Conference Problems, 14 U. CIN. L. REV. 324, 328-32 (1940); Isaacs, supra note 3, in 1935 predict-
ing the decline of a privity requirement in claims against lawyers. Of course Ward may be cited for what is
left of privity, as in Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1979).
14 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961).
15 The stage was set for Lucas in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (involving a
notary and an invalid will). See also Weintz v. Kramer, 44 La. Ann. 35 (similar facts) 10 So. 416 (1892),
Schirmer v. Nethercutt, 157 Wash. 172, 288 P. 265 (1930); Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash. 2d 581, 328 P.2d 164
(1958) (lawyer will cases in which the basis of liability is unclear).
16 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 7660, Comment a (1979), regarding the general apprehen-
sions inhibiting a duty of due care to prevent economic harm.
17 See discussion of lawyers and accountants in Keeton, supra note 3, at 445-47. But see Goodman v.
Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976) (Mosk, J., dissenting); Comment, At-
torney Malpractice-A "Greenian" Analysis, 57 NEB. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1978), suggesting preservation of
privity barrier would not help lawyers' image.
18 The situations in which lawyers have direct dealings with non-clients have built-in limits against
runaway liability. Further, not all lawyer-caused harms are purely economic. See, e.g., McEvoy v. Helikson,
277 Or. 781, 562 P.2d 540 (1977) (mental distress); Young v. Hecht, 3 Kan. 2d 510, 597 P.2d 682 (1979)
(mental distress and oppression). See generally text accompanying note 55 infra for a discussion of counter-
suits by doctors for groundless or vexatious litigation. Even though California has pioneered in this area,
there has been confusion in that state. See, e.g., Costello v. Wells Fargo Bank, 258 Cal. App. 2d 90, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 612 (1968) (distinguishing Lucas as not involving negligent interference with contract); Adams v.
[June 1980]
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Authoritative commentators have long felt that the law regarding
negligent interference with contract or more broadly put, economic loss caused
by negligence, has been much too restrictive.1 9 They argue that courts have
long allowed recovery for economic loss associated with tortious injury to per-
son or property. So it is not the feature of being "economic" but a matter of
deciding when it is appropriate to allow recovery for economic damage. Fur-
ther, if the fear is merely of liability which is potentially unlimited, intolerable,
or simply unfair in its extent compared with the culpability of the actor, why
not distinguish those situations which are not covered by the spectre of
unlimited liability? Courts have distinguished cases in which they can find
some sort of property injury.20 There has been some tendency to distinguish
cases in which liability is necessarily limited to one party.2 1 The strongest
countermovements are found in the trends involving negligent misrepresenta-
tion and lawyer duty to non-clients.2 2 These two trends may develop into a
single flow as part of a general theory of negligence which assimilates concerns
about economic harm into more generalized criteria.
23
Extension of the range of liability for misrepresentation is marked by the
leading case of Glanzer v. Shepard. 24 Plaintiff was a buyer of beans who relied on
the defendant's misstatement of weight. Defendant was a "public weigher"
who had been employed by the seller to provide the statement to the buyer. He
was held liable in negligence for acting "with the very end and aim of shaping
the conduct of another.' '25 Glanzer posed no threat as precedent because liabili-
ty was necessarily limited to one party. It was distinguished in the well-known
Ultramares v. Touche, Niven & Co. 26 There an accounting firm was held to be
under no duty of due care in making out a balance sheet which was relied upon
by a lender to defendant's client. A contrary holding would, said Cardozo, en-
tail "liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an in-
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 37, 123 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1975) (citing Lucas as precedent for
broadly extending liability for economic damage); Jackson v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 93 Cal. App. 3d 838,
155 Cal.Rptr. 905 (1979) (citing Lucas as an in-between precedent justifying insurance company liability
without privity).
19 SeeJames, supra note 9, at 46 n.23; Keeton, supra note 3, at 445-53. Both authors retrench a bit. See
also Note, Negligent Interference with Contract: Knowledge as a Standard for Recovery, 63 VA. L. REV. 813 (1977);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C (1979).
20 Newlin v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 316 Mass. 234, 54 N.E.2d 929 (1944) (damaged power line
and loss of mushroom crop); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 766C, Comment b (1979).
21 SeeJames, supra note 9, at 57; Keeton, supra note 3, at 452; see also Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d
73 (Mo. 1967) (architect); Craig v. Everett M. Brooks Co., 351 Mass. 497, 222 N.E.2d 752 (1967)
(engineer). Both Westerhold and Craig rely on Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) and
related reasoning.
22 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C, Comment e (1979), mentioning these two exceptions
to the rule against liability for remote economic harm; Note, Negligent Interference with Contract: Knowledge as a
Standardfor Recovery, 63 VA. L. REV. 813, 832 discussing the theory of negligent misrepresentation as a model
for broader question of economic harm.
23 For case illustration of merger of theories of lawyer duty to non-clients and negligent misrepresenta-
tion, see Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976);
Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976).
J'aire Corporation v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979) (illustrating
how lawyer cases relate to the larger picture of economic harm). See also In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d
821 (2d Cir. 1968) (relying on proximate cause as a mechanism of controlling liability); Union Oil Co. v.
Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (relying on the "duty" concept and foreseeability).
24 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
25 Id. at 242, 135 N.E. at 277.
26 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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determinate class." 27 He noted that professions other than accountants could
be affected-lawyers, for instance.
The contemporary trend on misrepresentation goes beyond Glanzer and
runs counter to Ultramares, as reflected in section 552 of the Restatement of
Torts, Second. Under this section accountants, lawyers, or others who supply
"false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions"
owe a duty of care but only to the person or members of the "limited group of
persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or
knows that the recipient intended to supply it. "28 This standard discards ab-
solute barriers while providing protection against the spectre of potential
liability in an endless chain of economic damages. An important aspect of this
approach is that it allows the information supplier to determine the range of
economic risks he can or cares to manage.
2 9
The Glanzer case on misrepresentation strongly supports the move in
Lucas, not a misrepresentation case, to impose a duty on the will-drafting
lawyer. The bean weigher provided a service to the buyer under the direction
of the seller who paid for his service. In Lucas, the lawyer was to perform a ser-
vice to benefit the client's intended beneficiary under the direction of the client
who paid for the service. Thus, under general negligence theory the move from
Glanzer to Lucas is indeed a small one. 30 Put more broadly, the criteria that sup-
port duty under the misrepresentation theory as characterized in the Restate-
ment of Torts also support a duty as generalized from the Lucas case. Lucas in-
volved a lawyer who was employed to provide a benefit for a specific person
who was not a client. 31 As is true of suppliers of information, the supplier of
27 Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
28 Mess, Accountants and the Common Law: Liability to Third Parties, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 838, 851 n.57
(1977) quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $ 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966); See also M. EPSTEIN & E.
WEISS, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ACCOUNTANTS' LEGAL LIABILITY (1977); Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 979 (1972).
For application to lawyers see Martindale, Attorneys' Liability in Non-Client and Foreign Law Situations, 14
CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 44 (1965); Averill, Attorneys' Liability to Third Partiesfor Negligent Malpractice, 2 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 379 (1967). For a comparison of lawyers and accountants see Keeton, supra note 3, at
451-53; Note, Public Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Party, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 588 (1972);
Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969); Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974).
29 Keeton, supra note 3, at 445-47 asserts that contract limits on liability are necessary to give lawyers
economic control, but other mechanisms serve as well, e.g., qualification of statements and caveats in opin-
ion letters.-See Freeman, Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973 DUKE L. J. 371, 389-90; Bittner, Lawyers'
Letters to Auditors, 59 CHI. B. REC. 7 (1977); Shipman, The Need for SEC Rules Under the Attorneys to Govern
Duties and Civil Liabilities of Federal Security Statutes, 34 OMO ST. L.J. 231, 241-45 (1973); Babb, Barnes, Gor-
don, & Kjellenberg, Legal Opinions to Third Parties in Corporate Transactions, 32 Bus. LAW. 553 (1977), other ar-
ticles cited; Comment, Legal Liability of the Professional Tax Practitioner, 26 EMORY L. REV. 403, 416 passim
(1977).
30 Glanzer was emphasized as precedent in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (the
notary will case which set the stage for Lucas).
31 Lucas involved the application of general criteria which were first set forth in Biakanja, "The deter-
mination... is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various factors, among which are ..... (1)
intent to affect the plaintiff, (2) foreseeability of harm to plaintiff, (3) degree of certainty that plaintiff suf-
fered the injury, (4) closeness of connection between defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (5) moral
blameworthiness of defendant's conduct, (6) policy of preventing future harm. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
Subsequently the criteria were applied in a situation involving a lawyer's opinion letter to the client's
prospective lender. Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr.
901 (1976). There was in a sense, as the court noted, intent to benefit the lender, but the more apt
characterization is that the lawyer knowingly undertook to affect the lender, in this instance on behalf of his
client.
The criteria have been applied, e.g., to accountants. See Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969),
Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974); Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493
S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. 1973). See also Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1967) (architect);
Howarth v. Pfeifer, 433 P.2d 39 (Alaska 1968) (insurance agent); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 13
Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974) (psychiatrist regarding physical harm).
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legal services to known third parties knows full well what economic risks are in-
volved and just as surely can decide whether he can or ought to manage the
situation in economic terms.
The evolution could rest with Lucas and a narrow application of the theory
of negligent misrepresentation on behalf of intended recipients. Cautious
courts can take those steps without overburdening the enterprise of lawyering
or for that matter any other activity.3 2 Modest steps can be taken by way of ex-
tension of or analogy to misrepresentation theory. Appropriate situations are
those in which a lawyer influences non-client behavior by assurances of some
limited undertaking.3 3 However, enough judicial experience has already been
accumulated to justify somewhat less cautious development. The general
mechanism of negligence theory seems adequate to the task of preserving con-
trol in the courts.34 The courts can maintain the evolution at a sufficiently slow
pace to permit lawyers in turn to adjust their practices and self-protective
techniques so as to manage the risks of liability to non-clients.
While the general theory of negligence is keyed to foreseeabiity, courts
have retained control over both the definition of the scope of duty and of the
weight of evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case for the jury. There
are some frontier areas where negligence theory has been specially shaped. The
duties of land occupants do not turn solely on foreseeability,3 5 nor do the duties
of those who negligently cause mental disturbance to persons not fearful for
their own safety.3 6 Whether one owes a duty to aid another in peril depends
upon special considerations.3 7 Key in the analysis of these areas and the fron-
tier area of lawyer duty to non-client are the relationships of the principal
characters in the relevant situation. Such keying to relationships allows courts
the fullest opportunity to balance important factors that would otherwise be
entertained by juries under general negligence theory in the non-frontier
areas.38 Courts have further control in all negligence cases stemming from their
32 Florida is illustrative. Lucas was followed in McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So.2d 1167 (Fla. App. 1976).
Subsequent cases show an inclination to stop at that move, Adams v. Chenowith, 349 So.2d 230 (Fla. App.
1977); Amey, Inc. v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 367 So.2d 633 (Fla. App. 1979).
33 See text accompanying notes 68-69 infra.
34 California has had the most visible activity, but so far rather tight reins have been maintained. See,
e.g., Haldane v. Freedman, 204 Cal. App. 2d 475, 22 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1962) (suggesting that privity remains
a requirement unless the Biakanja criteria balance favorably to duty) Ventura County Humane Society, Inc.
v. Holloway, 40 Cal. App. 3d 897, 115 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1974) (debatable limit of scope of lawyer's duty to
the beneficiary of a will). See note 48 infra, Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975)
(rejecting negligence theory against a lawyer who had litigated a claim merely in the hope that a basis for the
claim would develop); Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976)
(restricting scope of duty regarding negligent misrepresentation). See note 66 infra. Other courts have gone
further. See, e.g., Prescott v. Coppage, 266 Md. 562, 296 A.2d 150 (1972) (imposing a fiduciary duty in
favor of non-clients); Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J. Super. 581, 362 A.2d 581 (1976), as do Schwartz v.
Greenfield, Stein & Weisinger, 90 Misc. 2d 882, 396 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1977); and somewhat similarly, Sim-
merson v. Blanks, 149 Ga. App. 478, 254 S.E.2d 716 (1979).
35 Rowlands v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (giving historical
background and using Biakanja criteria, supra note 31, to give foreseeability a higher priority). An added
criterion was the prevalence and availability of insurance, a factor not yet discussedin the lawyer cases, but
seeJames, supra note 9; Keeton, supra note 3.
36 Discussed in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (setting forth
special criteria).
37 W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS, 340-43 (4th Ed. 1971); HARPER & JAMES, supra note 6, at 1044-53.
38 On general importance of relationship analysis, see Tobriner and Grodin, The Individual and the Public
Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1249-50 (1967); Green, Relational Interests,
29 ILL. L. REV. 460 (1934); 29 ILL. L. REV. 1041 (1934); 30 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1935); 30 ILL. L. REV. 314
(1935).
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power to define the scope of the duty owed. This power is especially significant
in the non-client cases.
39
Of prime concern in determining whether there is a duty to a non-client
and what its scope will be are the key relationships: (1) Lawyer to client; (2)
Lawyer to non-client (knowingly entered or undertaken by lawyer); and (3)
Client to non-client. 40 In place of the absolute weight given to the lawyer-client
relationship by privity is the high priority given to that relationship under the
developing special negligence theory. 41 Heavy in weight in the judicial balanc-
ing process are the loyalty and duty owed to the client, and the lawyer's re-
quisite freedom to pursue the client's interest without overburdening concern
for the interests of others. 42 Still, these interests may be outweighed if the
lawyer has been overzealous on behalf of his client or if other loyalties are
thought to be relevant. The less that duty burdens the lawyer-client relation-
ship, the more fairness in dealing with a non-client weighs, especially if the
lawyer had induced his reliance. Economic considerations remain of significant
importance 43 but at times they are outweighed by moral considerations. 44 Fur-
ther, there is a sense, however presently limited, that the business of lawyers is
affected with the public interest. At times it may appear relevant that a non-
client's claim may serve a regulatory function to deter lawyers from incompe-
tent or highly questionable practices.
III. The Duty and Its Scope
45
If a lawyer is employed to draft a will to include a particular beneficiary,
39 Most extensively discussed in Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1969). See also notes 47-49 and accompanying text infra. Even more subtle is judicial weighing of the
evidence, see notes 110-113 and accompanying text infra. On scope of duty generally, see HARPER &JAMES,
supra note 6, at ch. 28; PROSSER, supra note 6, at 326-27.
40 Probably all the cases recognizing duty to a non-client may be characterized as stemming from the
lawyer's undertaking of a special relationship. See similar point expressed by Prosser regarding claims for
loss of prospective advantage. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 952. Lack of a requisite relationship was noted in
such cases as Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879) (certificate of title for client); Goodman v. Ken-
nedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976) (wrong advice to client). Undertaking of rela-
tionship to both client and non-client was recognized in: Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161,'74
Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969) (will case); Prescott v. Coppage, 266 Md. 562, 296 A.2d 150 (1972) (corporation and
creditors); Fickett v. Superior Court, 27 Ariz. App. 793, 558 P.2d 988 (1976) (guardian and ward).
41 Many cases deny duty in a particular situation by reference to the lawyer-client relationship. See, e.g.,
Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879); Chalpin v. Brennan, 114 Ariz. 124, 559 P.2d 680 (1976);
Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976); Amey, Inc. v. Henderson,
Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 367 So.2d 633 (Fla. App. 1979); Bryan & Amidei v. Law, 435 S.W.2d 587 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1968); Goerke v. Vojvodich, 67 Wis. 2d 102, 226 N.W.2d 211 (1975).
42 The considerations relevant to duty set forth in this paragraph are reflected in the cases and
elaborated in the subsequent text. They go beyond the California criteria, see note 26 supra. Lutas added the
criterion of burden of duty on the legal profession. In one form or another, the California criteria have been
stated in a number of lawyer cases: Fickett v. Superior Court, 27 Ariz. App. 793, 558 P.2d 988 (1976);
Licata v. Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (1966); McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So.2d 1167 (Fla.
App. 1976); In re Killingsworth, 270 So.2d 196 (La. App. 1972); Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J. Super. 581,
362 A.2d 581 (1976); Schwartz v. Greenfield, Stein & Weisinger, 90 Misc. 2d 882, 396 N.Y.S.2d 582
(1977); Metzker v. Slocum, 272 Or. 313, 537 P.2d 74 (1975); and in non-lawyer cases, see note 26 supra. See
also Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 979, 986-87 (1972), recommending their use in cases involving accountants.
43 Economic considerations peculiar to the legal profession have not been explicitly considered in the
cases, see note 30 supra, but may be implicit in considering burden of duty on the profession. See, e.g., Good-
man v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976). For discussion regarding ac-
countants, see Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 979, 983-87 (1972). For comparison between accountants and lawyers,
see Note, Public Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence and Third Parties, 47 NOTRE DAME LAw. 588 (1972).
44 The moral factor was omitted from the California criteria in Lucas, possibly out of regard to the
defendant lawyer, but reinserted in Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
45 The analysis and citation of cases in this section reflect the perspectives developed in the preceding
section. Prece,-nts older than 20-30 years are weak, see note 30 supra. A seeming rejection of duty or a cite to
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his duty to the beneficiary under general negligence theory is especially com-
pelling. 46 Even so, the scope of that duty is dependent upon the client's expec-
tations, directions and actions. Thus, the lawyer would owe no duty to the
beneficiary to urge a large bequest even if based on recognizable moral con-
siderations, or to minimize tax consequences to preserve the residual estate by
refusing a clause which the fully informed testator demands. 47 The ultimate
importance of client autonomy may even protect the lawyer against respon-
sibility for a particular litigation-prone ambiguity. 48 The scope of duty is
shaped differently by the relationship between client and non-client in fiduciary
situations. A trustee or a guardian employs the lawyer and, in that sense, is his
client. Yet this client's directions to the lawyer cannot so readily define the
lawyer's duty if they run significantly counter to the clear obligations owed by
the fiduciary to the beneficiaries. If a trust is involved, for instance, the
lawyer's loyalties are split by law, the one of higher priority being that owed to
the trust and its beneficiaries.4 9 Under a related balancing, lawyer loyalty to
the client generally stops short of aiding or abetting criminal activity. Arguably
there is a duty owed to a non-client to prevent him from becoming a victim of
the client's announced criminal intentions to do him serious bodily or maybe
even economic harm, despite the nearly sacrosanct duty of preserving a client's
confidences. Clear moral or ethical duties, at least those imposed by the Code
of Professional Responsibility, ought not to be considered unduly burdensome
on the profession, even if backed by the economic pressure of potential
negligence claims.
50
Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879) may well be little more than a stand against foreseeability as the
prime criterion of duty. See, e.g., Goerke v. Vojvodich, 67 Wis. 2d 102, 226 N.W.2d 211 (1975). The
precedential strength of such an opinion is especially slight if it also analyzes its problem in light of otherwise
applicable negligence theory, see, e.g., Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Holt, 36 N.C. App. 284, 244 S.E.2d 177
(1978). If there are other signs in the jurisdiction that duty will likely be recognized, compare Victor v.
Goldman, 74 Misc. 2d 685, 344 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1973), aff'd, 43 A. D. 2d 1021, 351 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1974) (no
duty in will case) with Schwartz v. Greenfield, Stein & Weisinger, 90 Misc. 2d 882, 396 N.Y.S.2d 582
(1977) (voluntary undertaking) and White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474
(1977) (accountants' duty). Cases in which duty is denied involve situations which would be questionable in
duty jurisdictions, a point more strongly stated in MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 5, § 58 (1977).
46 See notes 14-15 supra. Other will cases include Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1969), rejecting "surplusage" of earlier third party beneficiary theory; Licata v. Spector, 26
Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (1966); Woodfork v. Sanders, 248 So.2d 419 (La. App. 1971), contract
theory; In re Killingsworth, 270 So.2d 196 (La. App. 1972), modi fied, 292 So.2d 536 (La. 1974); Maneri v.
Amodeo, 38 Misc. 2d 190, 238 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1963) (no duty); Victor v. Goldman, 74 Misc. 2d 685, 344
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1973), aff'd, 43 A.D. 2d 1021, 351 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1974) (no duty). But see note 40 supra
regarding New York's stand on duty generally.
See Bucquet v. Livingston, 57 Cal. App. 3d 914, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1976) (duty imposed in drafting of
trust instrument; Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971) (lawyer employed by col-
lection agency owes duty to creditor); cf. W. L. Douglas Shoe Co. v. Rollwage, 187 Ark. 1084, 63 S.W.2d
841 (1933) (similar situation but creditor called "client").
47 Adopted from Bucquet v. Livingston, 57 Cal. App. 3d 914, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1976). Scope of duty
analysis elaborated in Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
48 Ventura County Humane Society, Inc. v. Holloway, 40 Cal. App. 3d 897, 115 Cal. Rptr. 464
(1974), criticized for promoting questionable practices in, Note, Attorney Malpractice in California: The Liability
of a Lawyer Who Drafts an Imprecise Contract or Will, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 422, 439-42 (1976). See generally
HECMERLING, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 728-30, (Nov. 1977).
49 Fickett v. Superior Court, 27 Ariz. App. 793, 558 P.2d 988 (1976) (guardian of incompetent's estate
converted funds); Prescott v. Coppage, 266 Md. 562, 296 A.2d 150 (1972) (receiver attorney for corporate
debtor owes duty to creditors); In re Alexander, 360 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. 1962) (a lawyer dereliction of duty to
estate); In re Fraser, 83 Wash. 2d 884, 523 P.2d 921 (1974) (duty to ward as well as guardian, discipline
question). See also In re Brooks, 596 P.2d 1220 (Colo. App. 1979) (no duty to beneficiary in discretionary
situation); TransAmerican Ins. Co. v. Keown, 451 F. Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1978) (implying duty to
beneficiary of trust).
50 Compare Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129
(1974) (applying Biakanja criteria, see note 26 supra). Moral blameworthiness of the defendant is one factor.
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On the other hand, the priority of a lawyer's duty and loyalty to a client in
litigation and other adversarial situations practically precludes a finding of du-
ty to the adversary. It has even been held that a lawyer for a defendant in a
criminal case owed no duty to a potential witness for his client to warn him
about the risks of self-incrimination. 5 1 Such tactics are questionable. Yet how
could a lawyer effectively represent his client if he owed a duty to investigate
the potential risks to each of the witnesses who participate in the litigation?
Still, the lawyer's freedom is not absolute even in litigation.5 2 He may, for in-
stance, be ordered by the court to act in a certain way in favor of an adversary,
or he may have acted to cause a court to rely on his assurances in favor of an
adversary. Lawyers have under such circumstances been held subject to tort
sanction under a duty which the court has imposed on behalf of the
adversary.5 3 One of the more troublesome questions concerns the lawyer who
subjects not only his claimed adversary but a court to the burden of an
unmeritorious suit. Litigation is often an indispensable mechanism for clients
to realize their legal rights. Considerable benefit has come to society as a whole
by allowing lawyers freedom to be venturous in introducing causes that may at
one time have seemed unmeritorious or even groundless only later to be
recognized as the beginning of a new hope for advancing justice. Consequent-
ly, the persistent holding is that mere negligence is not a basis for the adver-
sary's claim.5 4 Yet the harm that can come to the reputation of innocent per-
sons, especially professionals such as physicians and lawyers, raises the ques-
tion whether carefully controlled standards for pursuing litigation might not be
better than almost absolite immunity.
55
The will-drafting sort of situation marks one end of a continuum with its
harmony of interests of lawyer, client, and non-client. At the other end, the
See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 4-101(C)(3); MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 5, at 629-30
1977); Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30
.C. L. REv. 281 (1979). Regarding lawyer's duty to report intention of client to commit crime relevant to
securities or income tax, see Shipman, The Need for SEC Rules to Govern Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys
Under the Federal Securities Statutes, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 231, 276 (1973).
51 De Luca v. Whatley, 42 Cal. App. 3d 574, 117 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1974) (client is the only intended
beneficiary).
52 Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 109 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1973) (a lawyer may be
liable to adversary for negligence in employment of private investigator).
53 See McEvoy v. Helikson, 277 Or. 781, 562 P.2d 540 (1977) (court imposed duty to retain client's
passport); Gottlieb v. Edelstein, 84 Misc. 2d 1053, 375 N.Y.S. 2d 532 (1975) (failure to inform court or
adversary of unpreparedness). See also Mountain States Implement Co. v. Sharp, 94 Idaho 255, 486 P.2d 80
(1971) (liability for costs to adverse party for taking default judgment); Lyons v. Paul, 321 S.W.2d 944
(Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (fraud on court based on duty to respond to unrepresented adversary's communica-
tions). But cf. Parnell v. Smart, 66 Cal. App. 3d 833, 136 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1977) (attorneys for automobile in-
surance carrier did not owe duty of care to adverse third party); Young v. Hecht, 3 Kan. App. 2d 510, 597
P.2d 682 (1979) (an attorney absent special circumstances is not liable for consequences of his professional
negligence to anyone other than his client).
54 Often cited is Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975) (using Biakanja
criteria, see note 31 supra, to determine that the proper claim is for malicious prosecution).
55 Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975) (strongly suggesting that evidence
of negligence might suffice under the rubric of malicious prosecution). See also Wolfram, The Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C. L. REv. 281, 310-14 (1979), sug-
gesting an implied cause of action based on the Code of Professional Responsibility; Birnbaum, Physicians
Counterattack: Liability of Lawyersfor Instituting Unjustified Malpractice Actions, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1003 (1977),
discussing harm to physicians; Thode, The Groundless Case-The Lawyer's Tort Duty to His Client and to the
Adverse Party, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 59, 72-74 (1979), discussing negligence claim.
Generally, an adversary must claim an intentional tort. See, e.g., Lackey v. Vickery, 57 F. Supp. 791
(W.D. Mo. 1944) (failure to remove lien); Farmer v. Crosby, 43 Minn. 459, 45 N.W. 866 (1890) (execution
upon void default judgment).
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litigational situation presents a sharp conflict of interests and an inverse
likelihood of duty owed from lawyer to opponent. In between lies a range of
relationships from nearly adversarial to divergent to collegial. The probability
of a duty relationship between a lawyer and a non-client increases as the situa-
tions vary from conflict to collegiality.5 6 In the sale of realty, for instance, the
lawyer's degree of involvement with the non-client will likely vary depending
on the relationship between the client and non-client. A sale of realty can be
between contentious parties but as well between friends or friendly business
associates. 5 7 Their interests diverge but the non-client is more apt to trust his
opinions and offers of limited service. Even in an arm's-length transaction,
there may be some degree of trust and reliance. If the lawyer deliberately puts
his opinion or his credibility on the line by promise, assurance of benefit,, or
material representations, it is not unfair to expect him to act responsibly as
befits the profession.5 8 Further, it seems appropriate to allocate the known or
knowable economic risks of his negligence to the lawyering enterprise.
The grounds for duty are clearest when a lawyer makes material represen-
tations to a non-client, especially if at the client's request. 59 Illustrative are the
opinion letter regarding the client's legal status directed to a prospective lender
and the title opinion directed to a prospective buyer. 60 The scope of duty in
such situations should be carefully calibrated by courts to correlate with a
lawyer's obligation to his client so as not to unduly inhibit or burden the
lawyer-client relationship generally. His duty will run only to those he agrees
56 See, e.g., Collins v. Fitzwater, 277 Or. 401, 560 P.2d 1074 (1977) (relationship between the director
of a corporation and corporate counsel); Fickett v. Superior Court, 27 Ariz. App. 793, 558 P.2d 988 (1976)
(lawyer for guardian and ward). The "closer" the relationships, the more likely a finding of a lawyer-client
relationship with more than one party. See text accompanying notes 104 and 105 infra.
57 The cases in this section generally involve assumptions by courts that land sale transactions are arm's
length or even adversarial. See, e.g., Adams v. Chenowith, 349 So.2d 230 (Fla. App. 1977) (closing state-
ment); Amey, Inc. v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes, & Holt, 367 So.2d 633 (Fla. App. 1979) (buyer and
lender's lawyer). But cf Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897) (finding an "undertaking");
Blevin v. Mayfield, 189 Cal. App. 2d 649, 11 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1961); Busey v. Perkins, 168 Md. 19, 176 A.
474 (1935) (no conflict of interest for disciplinary purposes in representing both buyer and seller where close
relationships).
Of all the cases involving claims by a non-client, no doubt the least defensible in supporting a purely
adversarial approach in a non-litigation setting is Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 31 A.2d 312 (1943), in
which an unrepresented seller who had given limited warranty was persuaded by a lawyer for the buyer that
she had to make good on a subsequently discovered defect of title not legally covered by the warranty.
58 The more harmonious the relationships, or the more the lawyer acts to make them appear har-
monious, the easier it is to establish justifiable reliance on the lawyer's behavior under theories of
misrepresentation or undertaking of duty by assurance or promise. See text accompanying notes 68 and 69
infra.
59 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 552, notes 24-29 and accompanying text supra.
60 See, e.g., Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown and Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901
(1976) (letter from borrower's lawyer to lender) (using Biakanja criteria). See also Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.
2d 395 (Iowa 1969), (applying § 552 to accountants and, in dictum, to lawyers); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W. 2d
902 (Iowa 1978); Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974) (approving Ryan as to accountants
and lawyers).
See also Capitol Bank & Trust Co. v. Core, 343 So.2d 284 (La. App. 1977) (title opinion, contract
theory complemented by tort references); Security National Bank v. Lish, 311 A.2d 833 (D.C. App. 1973)
(title assurance to client's bank); Reamer v. Kessler, 233 Md. 311, 196 A.2d 896 (1964) (certificate of title,
"employment" rationale, with approving reference to tort theory). Similarly, Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa.
532, 37 A. 98 (1897). Contra, In Re Cushman, 95 Misc. 9, 160 N.Y.S. 661 (1916) (a title opinion case which
would fit § 552; see note 46 supra regarding New York precedent).
Other cases with misrepresentation dimensions include Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 31 A.2d 312
(1943) (lawyer misleads unrepresented party in contemporary § 552 situation); Chalpin v. Brennan, 114
Ariz. 124, 559 P.2d 680 (1976) (claimed misrepresentations in contract, eschewing duty in favor of
arm's-length freedom); Adams v. Chenowith, 349 So.2d 230 (Fla. App. 1977) (unrepresented vendee can-
not rely on closing statement by lawyer vendor); O'Brien v. Larson, 11 Wash. App. 52, 521 P.2d 228 (1974)
(vendee cannot rely on lawyer whose role is characterized as merely escrow agent).
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or chooses to influence, giving him control to qualify or limit his statements or
to decline opinion or comment altogether.61 The non-client cannot expect him
to act differently from the way lawyers ordinarily do unless he offers more.
Thus, a lawyer's opinion letter incorporating his client's assertions may be
reasonable whereas an accountant's audit similarly based might not be. 62 His
obligation to discover liens on realty may vary between a lending situation and
a sale if it accords with lawyer practice. 63 He should not, short of fraud, be re-
quired to disclose negative facts against his client's interests in an arm's-length
transaction so long as his affirmative representations are not misleading. 64
If the lawyer does not make representations directly to the non-client, a
finding of duty would almost always be dubious, except for the writing he
knows will be used by the client for a specified purpose and defined audience.
65
Otherwise, the lawyer's counseling function would be severely burdened.
66 It
is unreasonable to require a lawyer to protect against client distortions by
reducing everything to writing. Further, a non-client's right to rely could not
ordinarily be justified. If the lawyer knows his client will repeat his representa-
tions to the non-client, or he urges him to do so, a liberalized test of fraud
would probably serve best. If his utterances demonstrate recklessness or gross
61 Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879) is often cited as the leading case, see notes 1, 13 and 45
supra. Ward would not, however, meet test of § 552 today, because the purpose of opinion was not known to
defendant lawyer. Semble, Dundee Mortgage and Trust Investment Co. v. Hughes, 20 F. 39 (D. Or. 1884);
Currey v. Butcher, 37 Or. 380, 61 P. 631 (1900) (concerning a certificate of title, no duty was shown, but
knowledge of defendant lawyer unclear). For cases regarding a lawyer's capacity to limit liability, see note 29
supra.
62 Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974).
63 Amey, Inc. v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 367 So.2d 633 (Fla. App. 1979); Chicago Title
Ins. Co. v. Holt, 36 N.C. App. 284, 244 S.E.2d 177 (1978).
64 Goerke v. Vojvodich, 67 Wis. 2d 102, 226 N.W.2d 211 (1975) (position on privity unclear but no
duty to disclose in arm's-length transaction); Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375,
556 P.2d 737 (1976). But cf. Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown and Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128
Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976) (half-truths basis of negligence claim).
An analysis of non-lawyer cases strengthens the prediction that the negligent misrepresentation theory
will be applied to lawyers; see note 31, supra. See also Craig v. Everett M. Brooks Co., 351 Mass. 497, 222
N.E.2d 752 (1967) (a case concerning an engineer) ; Barry, Legal Malpractice in Massachusetts, 63 MASS. L.
REv. 15, 24 (1978) (suggesting that the state will apply a similar duty to lawyers).
Sales of securities present special questions in which the issues of state common law and federal
statutory interpretation intertwine. See Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), discussed in Ship-
man, Professional Responsibility of the Corporate Lawyer, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A GuIDE TO ATTORNEYS,
271, 306-09 (1979); Goodman v. Kennedy, see note 64 supra. See also Parker, Attorney Liability Under the
Securities Laws After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 10 Loy. L. REv. 521 (1977); Note, Attorney Malpractice in
California, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 422 (1976); Smith, Preventing Errors in Securities Transactions, 30 S.C. L. REv.
243 (1979).
65 RESTATEMENT (SEcoNo) OF TORTS § 552(2) (1977).
66 Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976). Because of their
lawyer's erroneous advice, corporate officers issued stock to themselves under the mistaken belief that any
subsequent sale would be exempt from federal registration requirements. Plaintiff purchasers acquired
ultimately worthless stock with no remedy against insolvent officers. A finding of no duty was based on the
importance of the lawyer-client relationship and lack of any undertaking by defendant to benefit or influence
the plaintiffs. The vigorous dissent based duty on the lawyer as the chief instrumentality of plaintiffs' clearly
foreseeable economic loss, the lack of an alternative remedy, and a conception of the attorney as an officer of
the law not just the agent of the client. It is difficult to distinguish the purely economic aspect of the case
from that of other cases allowing recovery for a discrete, almost packaged, loss. See, e.g., notes 20 and 21
supra. It meets the idea of a built-in and recognizable limit in § 552. Yet it is difficult to see how the prece-
dent could be controlled to protect the lawyer's counseling function generally. See note 75 and accompanying
text infra. See also Commercial Standard Title Co. v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. 3d 934, 155 Cal. Rptr. 393
(1979) (relying on Goodman in claim that defendant negligently advised his client so that he relied on plain-
tiffs "lot book guarantees").
Compare the situation in which one lawyer gives an opinion at the request of a second lawyer for use by
the latter in aid of his client. At least one writer believes this situation establishes a duty relationship between
the first lawyer and the client of the second lawyer. Martindale, Attorney's Liability in Non-Client and Foreign
Law Situations, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 44 (1965).
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negligence in their lack of concern for truth or validity, then there seems no
good reason to protect him from liability.
67
Lawyers also mislead through direct promises and assurances of some
benefit to non-clients. A lawyer might, for instance, persuade a seller of realty
to complete the closing of the transaction with his client, the buyer, by offering
to perform some service material to the seller, perhaps to record a related
security interest. If there is intent to induce reliance, the same reasons that sup-
port duty in misrepresentation situations support them here. 68 Additionally,
our law is laced with principles holding individuals responsible for creating
justifiable expectations in persons who rely to their detriment. 69 Here, there is
the added feature that a lawyer may more readily create such expectations
which as a professional he should honor, especially but not only if he is serving
his client in the process. The limits of legitimate zeal in such service are of
course surpassed by fraud. But even negligent overreaching can legitimately be
discouraged when it is so easy for a lawyer to avoid intruding or to issue ap-
propriate caveats. •
Whether particular assurances give rise to duty should turn on the lawyer-
client relationship involved in the situation. Also important is the question,
when may a non-client legitimately expect a lawyer to be concerned with his in-
terests. The more that good and responsible practice requires the lawyer to
devote his attentions to his client, the less non-clients' expectations should be
turned into rights. 70 Suppose, for instance, in a divorce situation the wife is
represented by a lawyer and the husband is not. As part of the settlement, the
husband delivers a quitclaim deed to certain property to the lawyer, with the
wife as grantee. Part of the agreement is that the wife will grant other property
67 Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403, 18 N.E. 168 (1888) (deceit maintainable in a
situation in which defendant states that a matter is of his own knowledge when he does not know); Scandrett
v. Greenhouse, 244 Wis. 108, 11 N.W. 2d 510 (1943) (maintainable in a situation in which the behavior was
"wrongful" even if not clearly fraudulent) Cardozo stated that recklessness or even gross negligence could
be the basis for an inference of fraud. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E.
441 (1931). See Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 979, 987 (1972), discussing this test with respect to accountants; Metz-
ger and Heintz, Hochfelder's Progeny: Implications for the Auditor, 63 MINN. L. REv. 79 (1978), regarding
recklessness as a test of scienter in the securities area.
68 Schwartz v. Greenfield, Stein, & Weising&, 90 Misc. 2d 882, 396 N.Y.S. 2d 582 (1977) (failing to
record security agreement in proper place). Schwartz relies on Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J. Super. 581, 362
A.2d 584 (1976), in which the court found a duty based on failure to return mortgage instruments as prom-
ised at closing, even though the defendant lawyer engaged in highly questionable tactics, both cases finding
an undertaking of afiduciay relationship. See also, Simmerson v. Blanks, 149 Ga. App. 478, 254 S.E. 2d 716
(1979) (gratuitous promise after closing, but lawyer recorded papers in wrong county, and was held to stan-
dard of expertise proffered); Security National Bank v. Lish, 311 A.2d 833 (D.C. App. 1973), (lawyer's
gratuitous assurance to lender of client's title in property offered as security). But cf Jacobsen v. Overseas
Tankship Corp, 11 F.R.D. 97 (E.D. N.Y. 1950) (no duty to obtain promised release discharging plaintiff as
joint tortfeasor of client); McGlone v. Lacey, 288 F.Supp. 662 (D.S.D. 1968) and Delta Equipment and
Construction Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 186 So.2d 454 (La. App. 1966) (no undertaking to act as lawyer
for plaintiff); Young v. Hecht, 3 Kan. 2d 510, 597 P.2d 682 (1979) (no right to rely on assurances of lawyer
for wife in separate maintenance action).
69 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs 5 766C, Comment e (1977), "other cases involving other
services than the supplying of information, may not fall within the exact provisions of § 552, but are covered
by the general principle underlying it." RESTATEMENT OF AOENCY § 378, relied upon in Simmerson v.
Blanks, 149 Ga. App. 478, 254 S.E. 2d 716 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS 5 323 (1977), relied
upon in Schwartz v. Greenfield, Stein, and Weisinger, 90 Misc. 2d 882, 396 N.Y. 2d 582 (1977); RESTATE-
MENT (SECoND) OF TORTS S 324A, relied upon in Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 NJ. Super, 581, 362 A.2d 581
(1976); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 5 90, discussed but not applicable in McGlone v. Lacey, 288 F. Supp.
662 (D.S.D. 1968). See also, Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARv. L. REv. 913
(1951).
70 See, e.g., Mason v. Levy & Van Bourg, 77 Cal. App. 3d 60, 143 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978). In Mason,
plaintiff lawyer referred the case to defendant lawyer on a contingency basis. The court found that there was
no duty to prevent running of statute of limitations. Precedent would promote split loyalties.
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to the husband's brother. His best security for her performance would have
been to place the deed in escrow, but of course he is not aware of that option,
and the lawyer has no obligation to advise him. Nor has he the right to expect
the lawyer not to record the deed or deliver it to the wife.7 1 If the lawyer re-
ceived the quitclaim deed upon assuring the husband that the wife would per-
form, then quite arguably he has crossed the line of duty not to let her have the
deed. Yet if he advised the husband to record the deed, saying he would make
sure the wife performed, duty is doubtful. Only assurances that he can carry
out and that place no questionable burden on his client should give rise to a
right to rely.72 If conceivably the divorce were friendly or if the basic transac-
tion were a friendly exchange of property between a husband and wife instead
of divorce, it would be easier to imply an assurance of protection of the hus-
band's interest. Given an explicit assurance, the husband ought to be protected
because then there is a definite undertaking which imposes no undue burden
on the lawyer. His involvement with the husband is deeper, his commitment
firmer. He can avoid the responsibility by refusing the deed or recommending
an escrow arrangement.
73
There will always be cases in which a lawyer will be insulated from liabili-
ty to non-clients for his negligence. Included will be some cases in which he
knows or even intends harm will occur to them. The value of the lawyer-client
relationship will outweigh the harm as often as may the interest of the lawyer to
be free to make mistakes, even to the point of incompetence, for the sake of
lawyer freedom generally. 74 Even if the privity requirement should entirely
disappear or the general principle against liability for negligently causing
economic harm be significantly eroded, negligence theory will protect against
the lifting of the floodgates to unreasonable or uncertain economic risks. Con-
sequently, a lawyer may, with little risk, advise his client of his option to breach
a contract, or even counsel the breach as good strategy, if he sticks to advice
71 See, e.g., Weigel v. Hardesty, 37 Colo. App. 541, 549 P.2d 1335 (1976) (lawyer's duty owed entirely
to the wife, lawyer cannot act as escrow agent under these circumstances). But see Lyon v. Paul, 321 S.W. 2d
944 (Tex. App. 1958); (lawyer for plaintiff in clearing of title suit did not return to unrepresented plaintiff
communications significant to the suit).
72 In Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J. Super. 581, 362 A.2d 581 (1976), the court was careful to place duty
on defendant lawyers' failure to inform plaintiff the mortgage had not been executed as promised, rather
than on the failure to obtain signatures he could not guarantee. But cf. Robertson v. Clocke, 18 A.D. 363, 46
N.Y.S. 87 (1897) (lawyer confronted with contempt charges if he did not deliver to mortgagor a promised
extension of the mortgage from his client mortgagee, although the undertaking may not have been
gratuitous).
73 See generally the analysis of the next section and particularly notes 111-115 and accompanying text
infra.
74 A lawyer's negligence to his client does not alone give rise to a duty to a non-client; McDonald v.
Stewart, 289 Minn. 35, 182 N.W. 2d 437 (1970); D & C Textile Corp. v. Rudin, 41 Misc. 2d 916, 246
N.Y.S. 2d 813 (1964); Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976);
Mason v. Levy & Van Bourg, 77 Cal. App. 2d 60, 143 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978); Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d
1250 (Utah 1979). A non-client who claims that a lawyer has been jointly negligent with him in damaging a
third party may not be able to claim indemnity or contribution for the same policy considerations that would
prevent his claim of duty. Held v. Arant, 67 Cal. App. 3d 748, 134 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1977); Commercial
Standard Title Co. v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. App. 3d 934, 155 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1979) (the client is thus
allowed to select his judgment debtor who has no recourse).
Unless there is an undertaking in favor of a non-client, the lawyer's duty in drafting instruments will
most likely run only to his client. See, e.g., Drawdy v. Sapp, 365 So.2d 461 (Fla. App. 1978) (deed from
client husband to wife); Adams v. Chenowith, 349 So.2d 230 (Fla. App. 1977) (erroneous closing




and counsel and avoids conspiratorial or malicious instigation. 75 However
questionable the morality of a particular breach might be, if it is the client's
legal option, and even if the lawyer can predict with high certainty the breach,
the advising and counseling function will have priority. 76 More questionable
would be advising the commission of a tort, at least one involving fault.
77
Stronger for the imposition of duty would be counseling or advising a crime
that harms another party. Tort or crime, if bodily harm is involved, deterrence
of such lawyer activity seems desirable because a damage claim against the
client would rarely be acceptable as adequate although in breach of contract
situations it usually would be.
7"
Often a lawyer performs a service or pursues a course of action for a client
which he reasonably should foresee or indeed knows will be the subject of
reliance by another person. Even if the other party's reliance is arguably
reasonable, or even if most lawyers would take account of the other person's in-
terest, duty may still be lacking although the lawyer-client relationship would
not be burdened. Representative is the situation in which an employee has
been reimbursed by an insurer which carries workmen's compensation in-
surance on his job. The carrier has notice that the employee's lawyer intends to
litigate a claim against a third-party tortfeasor. The carrier is entitled to a por-
tion of the proceeds of either the settlement or the judgmeht. Conceivably, the
carrier would have reason to believe that the lawyer would competently pursue
the claim. If the lawyer should negligently let the statute of limitations run, the
employee would have a claim against him. Since the carrier's claim is so in-
timately related to the employee's it is arguable the carrier ought to have a
75 McDonald v. Stewart, 289 Minn. 35, 182 N.W.2d 437 (1970); D & C Textile Corp. v. Rudin, 41
Misc. 2d 916, 246 N.Y.S. 2d 813 (1964); Costello v. Wells Fargo Bank, 258 Cal. App. 2d 90, 65 Cal. Rptr.
612 (1968); Jaffee v. Rubinstein, 24 A.D. 2d 752, 263 N.Y.S. 2d 867 (1965), appeal dismissed, 21 N.Y. 2d
721, 234 N.E.2d 706 (1968). For the related notion that one who misadvises his client should not be liable on
a theory of negligent misrepresentation to a non-client affected by the advice, see note 66 and accompanying
text supra. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS 5 772, dealing with the privilege of honest advisers, and
Comment "c" noting the possible exception for negligent misrepresentation.
76 An attorney apparently can cross the line, however, to liability for intentional interference. See, e.g.,
Warner v. Roadshow Attractions Co., 56 Cal. 2d 1, 132 P.2d 35 (1943); Kasen v. Morrell, 18 Misc. 2d 151,
183 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1959). Skelly v. Richman, 10 Cal. App.3d 844, 89 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1970). But cf., Bayon
v. Pettingill, 77 So.2d 202 (La. App. 1955) (not liable for stopping payment on check); Weigel v. Hardesty,
549 P.2d 1335 (Colo. App. 1976) (facilitating client's breach by recording of quitclaim deed).
77 How far the lawyer must go in involvement with a client's tort in part depends on the court's attitude
toward lawyer roles. See, e.g., Grand Isle Campsites, Inc. v. Cheek, 262 La. 5, 262 So.2d 350 (1972) (as
merely the "agent" of the client, without personal responsibility) (knowing of client's deceit); Olympia
Roofing Co., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 288 So.2d 670 (La. App. 1974), aff'd 292 So.2d 244 (La. 1974)
sale ultra vires; Bayon v. Pettingill, 77 So.2d 202 (La. App. 1955). Cf. Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224,
28 N.W. 2d 780 (1947) (lawyer is not merely the agent of his client but can be liable if he knows of the
malicious motives of his client) Walter v. Doe, 93 Misc. 2d 286, 402 N.Y.S. 2d 723 (1978) (negligent
restraining of plaintiff's checking account called an intentional intervention). Whether issuance of execution
on property is actionable depends on lawyer's involvement. Ford v. Williams, 13 N.Y. 577 (1856), and ap-
peal of second trial, 24 N.Y. 367 (1862). For mistaken procurement of bench warrant against plaintiff, held
not actionable in negligence, see Havens v. Hardesty, 600 P.2d 116 (Colo. App. 1979). Merely advising
client in such a way that he commits significant but good faith trespass was not actionable. Daly v. Smith,
220 Cal. App. 2d 692, 33 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1963), but cf. Warner Roadshow, 56 Cal.2d 1, 132 P.2d 35 (1943)
Noble v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 109 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1973) (possibility of liability in
litigation context for invasion of privacy or negligence for employment of private investigators); McEvoy v.
Helikson, 277 Or. 781, 562 P.2d 540 (1977) (where privity not a barrier, recognizing liability of lawyer for
negligently causing mental disturbance, even without resulting physical damage). The claimant in Young v.
Hecht, 3 Kan. App. 2d 510, 597 P.2d 682 (1979) failed in claim of intentional infliction of mental distur-
bance or oppression.
78 See note 50 supra. See also Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountabiliy of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REv.
669 (1978), proposing new disciplinary rules for the nonadvocates, including prohibition against lawyers'
aiding in the commission of a tort.
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claim as well. Yet, there are ways for the carrier to protect its interests, and the
lawyer was neither employed nor undertook to protect them. Therefore, duty is
not imposed.7 9 Compare the case of a lawyer who aids his debtor-client in cut-
ting off the known contingent fee interest of the claimant's lawyer by settling
directly with the claimant. This is not simply the case of a lawyer advising or
helping his client breach his contract because the debtor-client in this sort of
case could be liable for extra damages to the lawyer with the contingent fee in-
terest.80 Liability for negligence to the non-client lawyer is unlikely lacking
some sort of assurance running from the debtor's lawyer to the claimant's
lawyer.8 1 Generally speaking, the lawyer should not be forced to be concerned
for the purely economic interests of other parties just because he and his client
will affect them, especially, as in this illustration, if the injured party has his
remedy in law, if not in fact. It is not in either illustration that lawyers should
be encouraged to act incompetently or inconsiderately, but that the tax on such
behavior should come from the clients themselves rather than burdening the
legal profession with concerns which are better protected by other means.
8 2
Yet even non-clients who have no other means of protection may not be
able to claim a duty from lawyers who well know of their interests but who
claim that they were not clearly employed to benefit them or that the range of
potential liability was too uncertain. Children's interests are particularly
vulnerable. In a California case, the defendant lawyer represented the wife in a
divorce situation. 83 He was sued on behalf of her children on the ground that he
negligently failed to prevent a depletion of her estate thus affecting their in-
heritance potentials, and perhaps their expectations of life-style. The court held
that the lawyer owed the children n6 duty because of the uncertainty of their
expectancies. 84 The remedy was a conservatorship. The lawyer might- have
been hired or voluntarily undertaken to consider the children's interests, but
otherwise, the wife, not the children, was his client. An Oregon case takes an
equally hard line in a more questionable situation. 85 A minor claimed that a
lawyer had negligently failed to perfect her adoption when hired for that pur-
79 Statutory mechanisms were available in Brian v. Christensen, 35 Cal. App. 3d 377, 110 Cal. Rptr.
688 (1973) and Soliz v. Spielman, 44 Cal. App. 3d 70, 118 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1974). Even though there was no
recourse whatsoever for bondsman, the same resulted in National Auto and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Atkins, 45
Cal. App. 3d 562, 119 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1975) (perhaps justifiable as risk of insurance enterprise). See also
Sinram v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 61 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1932) . But cf. Scandrette v. Greenhouse, 244 Wis.
108, 11 N.W. 2d 510 (1943) (willfully cutting off carrier's interest).
80 Bryan & Amidei v. Law, 435 S.W. 2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Annot., 26 A.L.R.3d 679 (1969),
defendants mostly insurers.
81 Bryan & Amidei v. Law, 435 S.W. 2d 587 (in dictum, the court said that even lawyers' knowledge of
contingency not enough). But cf. Skelly v. Richman, 10 Cal. App. 3d 844, 89 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1970) (in dic-
tum, the court said that more knowledge might make out case of "unlawful inducement" of breach of con-
tract). See also, Frazier v. Boccardo, 70 Cal. App. 3d 331, 138 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1977); Wolfram, supra note 55
at 309-10, who would invoke the Code of Professional Responsibility; Yourt v. McKee, 1 Utah 281 (1876)
(duty where lawyer receives money known to "belong" to another); Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 P.2d
1073 (1935); Mason v. Levy & Van Bourg, 77 Cal. App. 3d 60, 143 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978) (cutting off refer-
ral fee); Vale v. Heitner, 90 Misc. 2d 921, 396 N.Y.S. 2d 602 (1977) (duty found in dictum).
82 See also Lackey v. Vickery, 57 F.Supp. 791 (W.D. Mo. 1944) (no duty to discharge judgment lien);
Bloomer Amusement Co. v. Eskenazi, 394 N.E. 2d 16 (Ill. App. 1979) (no duty to record vendor's reserved
interest even where reliance likely, but no undertaking); Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1979),
(no duty to bail out predecessor lawyer); McCarthy, Attorney Malpractice in Trademark Cases, 66 TRADE MARK
REPORTER 250 (1976), speculating about duty to persons who rely on an invalid trademark.
83 Haldane v. Freedman, 204 Cal. App. 2d 475, 22 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1962).
84 Id. at 478, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 446-47.
85 Metzker v. Slocum, 272 Or. 313, 537 P.2d 74 (1975).
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pose by a husband and wife. Later when they separated, the putative father
refused to provide support and the court in divorce proceedings declined provi-
sion for her support because she had not been legally adopted. The court in this
case framed its rationale in terms of unforeseeability and the lack of certainty
that she would otherwise have obtained support. 8 6 The case invites comparison
with the will cases in which the duty to non-clients is clearest. Although it may
be true that the putative parents hired the lawyer to benefit the child in a
general way, there was probably no specific discussion or contemplation of hir-
ing him to vest her with rights of support, inheritance, dependency under social
security, and so on. If the case is at all supportable, it derives its merit in
recognizing how far liability might ultimately go if the precedent were set in a
claim like this. An imaginative court might have restricted the duty to the sup-
port right as a matter of providing at least some remedy to deter this kind of in-
competence . 7 These are the kinds of situations that raise questions whether
courts are realistic in presuming that lawyers always represent this client or
that rather than often undertaking to represent several interests in a particular
situation. Such is the concern of the next section.
IV. Duty and the Situation
In the future, the cases in the area of lawyer malpractice will probably
depict more realistically the varying roles and relationships that lawyers actual-
ly undertake. At the same time, misrepresentation theory and variations based
on its underlying premises likely will increasingly influence the evolution of
relevant tort law. Greater weight may be given to reasonable expectations that
lawyers will deal fairly with the people upon whom they exert influence. But no
floodgate will open because lawyers will develop contractual and other tech-
niques to limit their undertakings in appropriate ways. In the vein of a
somewhat more specific yet modest prognostication-as well as a complement
to the earlier analysis-a brief, mainly suggestive exploration follows. The in-
quiry probes some of the situations in which one lawyer involves himself other
than casually with two or more parties.
Lingering preference for privity in some courts reflects more than ap-
prehension of the floodgate peril. Such preference often appears to be a ra-
tionalization of several assumptions which ought now to surface. The underly-
ing model is that in most situations a lawyer has only one client, the party who
bears the formal signs. Other parties are supposedly on legal notice that the ex-
istence of the lawyer-client relationship implies that the client's interests take
precedence and that the non-client is at arm's length if not an adversary.88 In
86 Id. at 315, 537 P.2d at 76.
87 Compare further the duty owed to the ward of a guardianship. See note 49 supra.
88 The model or assumptions may be openly articulated. See, e.g., Goerke v. Vojvodich, 67 Wis. 2d 102,
226 N.W. 2d 211 (1975); Adams v. Chenowith, 349 So.2d 230 (Fla. App. 1977); Parnell v. Smart, 66 Cal.
App. 3d 833, 136 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1977); Amey, Inc. v. Henderson, 367 So.2d 633 (Fla. App. 1979); Young
v. Hecht, 597 P.2d 682 (Kan. App. 1979). It is, however, often apparent in the slant of an opinion. See Ken-
dall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 31 A.2d 312 (1943); McDonald v. Stewart, 289 Minn. 35, 182 N.W. 2d 437
(1970); Olympia Roofing Co. v. City of New Orleans, 288 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 1974); Weigel v. Hardesty,
549 P.2d 1335 (Colo. App. 1976); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Holt, 36 N.C. App. 284, 244 S.E. 2d 177
(1978); Stratton Group, Ltd. v. Sprayregen, 466 F. Supp. 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Compare Farmer v.
Crosby, 43 Minn. 459, 45 N.W. 866 (1890); with Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W. 2d 780
(1947) (abandonment of assumption that lawyer acts as the instrument of the client). See note 77 supra.
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practice, however, lawyers sometimes create different impressions. Moreover,
there are times when a lawyer may quite appropriately represent more than
one party by formal declaration,89 although neither a formal declaration nor a
contract is always necessary for the creation of the lawyer-client relationship. 90
Thus arises a future question for tort law: May some or all of the duties owed to
a formal client be generated from the apparently non-adversarial way a lawyer
is employed or chooses to act toward other parties?91 There are several ap-
proaches available. First, there is the approach previously analyzed that a
lawyer must use due care regarding his representations or assurances that are
reasonably relied upon by a non-client. Alternatively, a second party might be
treated as an "as if" or quasi-client, 92 or be characterized as a client by im-
plication.
93
Certain situations present prime occasions for representation or service by
a lawyer in the interests of two or more parties. 94 Illustrative is the formation of
a partnership. It is proper and indeed often desirable in such a situation that
there be but one lawyer and that he not try to promote an arm's-length at-
mosphere as two lawyers well might. The simple model of one lawyer, one
client, would cast this lawyer's loyalty as split. 95 If in fact his loyalty were prop-
erly understood to be to the group interests, then duty in tort should be
calibrated to his role in pursuing that end.
Suppose one prospective partner formally hired the lawyer. The agree-
ment developed much the way it would were both partners formally clients.
While not explicitly so, the situation bears analogy to the will cases wherein a
89 A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 5-105(c).
90 MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 5, S 72 (1977). See, e.g., Quaglino v. Quaglino, 88 Cal. App. 2d 542, 152
Cal. Rptr. 47 (1979) (no particular formality); Fort Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe, 381 F.2d 261
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1967). See also Ronnigen v. Hertogs, 294 Minn. 7, 199 N.W. 2d 420
(1972); Allman v. Winkelman, 106 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1939) (no fee necessary), discussed in comment, 27
ARK. L. REv. 452, 460 (1973). Barnes v. U.S., 381 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Neither implied contract nor
mutual consent necessary in some cases. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d
1311 (7th Cir. 1978); King v. King, 52 Ill. App. 3d 749, 367 N.E.2d 1358 (1977); Taylor v. Sheldon, 172
Ohio St. 118, 173 N.E.2d 892 (1961); Connelly v. Wolf, 463 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Note, Attorney
Malpractice: Use of Contract Analysis to Determine the Existence of an Attorney-Client Relationship, 63 MINN. L. REV.
751 (1979); Smith, Preventing Errors in Securities Transactions, 30 S.C. L. REV. 243 (1979), discussing how non-
formal lawyer-client relationships arise in security transactions.
The test may be the putative client's impressions because of the lawyer's misleading him. See Commit-
tee on Professional Ethics and Grievance v.Johnson, 447 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1971); Alexander v. Russo, 571
P.2d 350 (Kan. App. 1977) (despite lawyer's intent); Westinghouse; E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F.
Supp. 371 (D.C. Tex. 1969); King and Taylor (even if "client" only engages in preliminary conference with
lawyer); Note, 63 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1979). Cf. McGlone v. Lacy, 288 F.Supp. 662 (D.S.D. 1968); Delta
Equipment & Construction Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 186 So.2d 454 (La. App. 1966). See also WisE,
LEGAL ETHICS at 284 (1970); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 88, (2nd Ed. 1972).
91 See note 68 supra Schwartz v. Greenfield and Stewart v. Sbarro, regarding fiduciary duty to non-
client; Isaacs, Liability of the Lawyer for Bad Advice, 24 CAL. L. REv. 39 (1935), regarding significance of
holding out professional status.
92 Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897); Shirmer v. Nethercutt, 157 Wash. 172, 288 P. 265
(1930); Reamer v. Kessler, 233 Md. 311, 196 A.2d 896 (1964).
93 There are several kinds of implications: (1) implied-in-fact contract, (2) justifiable reliance implied
from relations and other facts, see note 90 supra, and (3) implied-in-law under tort analysis. Note, Attorney
Malpractice: Use of Contract Analysis to Determine the Existence of an Attorney-Client Relationship, 63 MINN. L. REV.
751 (1979).
94 See generally, HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE op LAW, at 43-86 (1978).
95 See, e.g., Adams v. Chenowith, 349 So.2d 230 (Fla. App. 1977) (in which the court apparently cannot
conceive of even a limited undertaking to the "other party" in a land sale, let alone that a lawyer might
represent both parties). A similar attitude pervades analysis in Keeton. Cf HAZARD, supra note 94 at 58-68;
Paul, A New Role for Lawyers in Contract Negotiations, 62 A.B.A.J. 93 (1976), lawyer serving both parties in
drafting contract, saving costs.
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lawyer owes a duty to a beneficiary. A lawyer can be employed to confer the
benefit of his service upon another who is not formally a client. 96 However, the
situation may bear closer analogy to the misrepresentation and assurance cases
if the lawyer intends or knows that the "non-client" will rely on his expertise.
The other prospective partner may well expect the lawyer to show him equal
fairness and consideration with the "client." The most appealing rationale
might be to call him a client also, by implication or because he was treated "as
if" a client. 97 The labelling is conclusory in the same way that an imposition of
a duty to a non-client is conclusory. 98 What matters more are the relevant con-
siderations to be balanced. Here, they are much like those we have previously
considered regarding duty to a non-client. 99
Sometimes a lawyer represents a situation °0 0 The circumstances are
similar to the partnership example but the implications may be somewhat less
clear. A family in business or in some other kind of activity is illustrative.
There might be a dominant family member who is the formal client. The
lawyer may undertake to perpetuate the business, perhaps by a reshuffling of
investments, compensation, or duties. His involvement with all relevant par-
ties could manifestly be for their common good. They could be led to the
reasonable expectation that he is looking out for all their interests and not tak-
ing unfair advantage. 10 1 A lawyer could adopt a similar role in estate planning
at the initiation of one spouse and at least seemingly in the interests of both.1
0 2
Other illustrations are a lawyer's mediation of a contract, either in formation
or transition, or an attempt to resolve the interests of an insolvent corporation
and its creditors. Almost any kind of transaction could be the occasion for this
role. 0 3 Merely because the parties could be at arm's length or their interests
later in conflict need not be determinative of the lawyer's role and duty at the
time of acting. 0 4 The way the parties are in fact related may legitimately be ex-
96 See notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra. See also note 46 supra.
97 See notes 91-93 and accompanying text supra.
98 Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) Tarasoffv. Regents of
the Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) ("duty" as a conclusory label);
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 5 53 (4th Ed. 1971).
99 See notes 31, 40-44 and accompanying text supra, regarding "Biakanja criteria" and other policy con-
siderations. The finer question concerns the scope of duty along a continuum of tripartite relationships in
which one party is a client and the other may also be a client or a non-client whose relationship to the other
parties is a variable. See Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976) (Breitel,
J. concurring), opting against Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968),
to retain the categories of invitee, licensee, and trespasser in land occupancy cases because they provide a
"sliding scale" and subsume the sort of policy considerations which were detailed in Rowland, in turn
adapted from the Biakanja sort of criteria. In Zalta v. Billips, 81 Cal. App. 3d 183, 144 Cal. Rptr. 888
(1978), the Biakanja criteria were applied, to determine not whether a duty was owed to a non-client but the
scope of duty owed to a client subsequent to successful litigation.
100 The expression "lawyer for the situation" was apparently originated by Louis D. Brandeis, later
Justice of the Supreme Court. See Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REv. 683 (1965).
See also HAZARD, supra note 94 at 58; Shipman, The Needfor SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of
Attorneys Under the Federal Securities Statutes, 34 OHio ST. L.J. 231, 257, 270 (1973).
101 The principles are similar to those underlying duty in misrepresentation and assurance cases, see
notes 58, 68, and 69 supra.
102 "A lawyer who single-mindedly seeks solely to advance his client's interests, taking full advantage of
all that the adversary system permits, is not necessarily better than the lawyer who as wise counselor helps
potentially conflicting parties resolve their differences in an amiable fashion." Corneel, Estate Planners: Where
Do Your Loyalties Lie? TRUSTS AND ESTATES, June, 1971, at 383, 423; containing numerous rich illustrations.
103 See Paul, supra note 95, (limited situational undertaking); Cf O'Brien v. Larson, 11 Wash. App. 52,
521 P.2d 228 (1974) (more restricted role than suggested by Paul).
104 "People have conflicts of interest only if, in addition to having divergent interests, one or both wish
to pursue them beyond a certain degree of aggression.... It also depends on the legal advice they may get."
HAZARD, supra note 94 at 55. MALLEN & LEVsT, supra note 5, at 149 (1977).
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amined, giving special consideration to the manner in which the lawyer relates
himself to the parties and their interests. t0 5
The comparative role of corporate counsel is instructive. The generally ac-
cepted premise is that he represents the corporate entity. 10 6 However, the fic-
tion should not cloud the facts.10 7 His role pragmatically requires that he relate
positively to the directors and high-level management. They will and in-
evitably must rely on his expertise. 108 When he advises them as representatives
of the corporation on the proper, legal functioning of the corporation, he is ad-
vising them for their benefit how they should act in their role. It is for the
benefit of the corporation that he act in this fashion. Their interests and those
of the corporation are, in this sense, in harmony even if legally distinct. If a
conflict should arise between the interests of the corporation and that of an ex-
ecutive, then the lawyer may treat the executive as he ought a second client
with a present conflicting interest against the corporate client by divorcing
himself from that relationship. 0 9 Short of such conflict, however, to require
key corporate representatives to consult their own lawyers at every turn would
hardly be in the best interest of corporations or their lawyers. The basis for du-
ty to a non-client or an "as-if" client could not be much clearer. 10
In any situation in which only one lawyer is involved with two or more
parties, he may knowingly or negligently lead a non-client to believe he is deal-
105 Of course there are hazards in representing a situation; MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 5, at §§ 95-6, 99;
Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Lockhart, 285 Md. 586, 403 A. 2d 1241 (1979); Ishmael v. Millington, 241
Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966); (an interesting problem discussed in Smith, Preventing Errors in
Securities Transactions, 30 S.C. L. REv. 243, 266-67 (1979)).
106 "A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity
and not to its stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the en-
tity." A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-18.
107 The C.P.R. has been described as "irrelevant, internally inconsistent, self-serving, ambiguous, and
finally, conspiratorial." Note, Client Fraud and the Lawyer, 62 MINN. L. REv. 89, 117 (1977) as quoted in
Wheat, The Impact of SEC Professional Responsibility Standards, 34 Bus. LAW 969, 970 (1979).
108 The growing view is that the corporate lawyer owes a complex of duties; see, e.g., Rowan v. LeMars
Mutual Ins. Co. of Iowa, 282 N.W. 2d 639 (Ia. 1979); Shipman, The Needfor SEC Rules to Govern the Duties
and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys Under the Federal Securities Laws, 34 OIo ST. L.J. 231, 257 (1973), referring to
duties to directors, management, and shareholders, and to the lawyers representing a situation; Shipman, at
253, 257, based on the holding of Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 947 (1971) in which he analyzes as treating the corporate entity and its shareholders asjoint clients. See
also, Freeman, Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973 DUKE L.J. 371; Leibman, The Change in Client Relation-
ships-The Interface with General Counsel, 34 Bus. LAW. 957, 958 (1979); HAZARD, supra note 94 at 43-7; J.
LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 182-191 (1978); Borowitz, Cohen, Bernant, Klott, Who Is the Client? in Legal
Opinions and Accountant Certifications, 2 PRACTICINO LAW INSTITUTE (1975).
109 Appropriate lawyer action in such a situation is described, e.g. in E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305
F. Supp. 371, 396 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Shipman, Professional Responsibility of the Corporation Lawyer, in PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSxBILITY: A GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS 271, 279-83 (1978); Leibman, supra note 108.
110 Collins v. Fitzwater, 277 Or. 401, 560 P.2d 1074 (1977) (duty owed to director in corporate matters).
See also, Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash.2d 581, 328 P.2d 164 (1958), in which it was equally unclear whether the
plaintiff was treated as a client or a non-client, although the choice was not crucial. See note 98 supra. Cf
Stratton Group, Ltd. v. Sprayregen, 466 F. Supp. 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (declining client status to in-
dividual officers and directors). The reported facts are too sparse to determine if there was arguably a basis
for reliance by plaintiffs in the particular circumstances. See also Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Holt, 36 N.C.
App. 284, 244 S.E. 2d 177 (1978) (scant evidence of basis of holding out and justifiable reliance).
Shipman, supra note 108, believes the "joint client" argument is a means of avoiding the privity ques-
tion. Another commentator characterizes persons entitled to redress under federal securities laws as
"clients." Smith, Preventing Errors in Securities Transactions, 30 S.C. L. REv. 243,254 (1979); but cf. Goodman
v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 566 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976) (Mosk,J., dissenting) (favoring duty
to purchasers of stock under the non-client approach). See also Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc.,
458 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1972) (all members of an unincorporated association as clients by implication);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978). "The client is no longer
simply the person who walks into a law office." Id. at 1318. Citing HAZARD note 94 supra, and Lieberman
note 108 supra. Consider also the non-client approach in guardianship, trust, and other such fiduciary situa-
tions. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
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ing fairly and carefully with him and his interests. 11 ' Two related future issues
appear: Will evidence of a lawyer's holding himself out in such a way support
an imposition of duty, and how much should it take to make out a prima facie
case or even raise a presumption?' 1 2 There are situations in which the potential
for one party and his lawyer to take advantage of an unrepresented party runs
high. The settlement of a divorce is one. In the corporate setting, taking advan-
tage is much less likely, but the odds favor justifiable reliance. On the other
hand, in business situations, the dealings are usually at arm's length. In the
divorce setting, the lawyer can protect himself readily enough. He may and
probably should advise the parties to have independent counsel where property
and children are involved. If he does not, the badge of suspicion might
reasonably make out a prima facie case."13 He should at least be prepared to
counter with evidence that he fully informed the non-client of his option or the
need to have independent counsel and generally of the risk if he does not. In the
corporate setting, a rebuttable presumption of a duty relationship seems
eminently justified. 1 14 In situations that are usually at arm's length, such as
land sales, the burden should remain on the claimant, but a lawyer's duty to a
non-client ought not to be precluded by an irrebuttable presumption that the
transaction was at arm's length or even adversarial."t 5 In appropriate situa-
tions, easing of the claimant's burden in litigation can have a salutary long-
range impact. Lawyers should avoid the temptation of unfair dealing or even
the appearance of it. Every lawyer should examine his role in a specific situa-
111 A lawyer may be negligent to a party who is represented by his own lawyer, as in Stewart v. Sbarro,
142 N.J. Super. 581, 362 A.2d 581 (1976); and in misrepresentation situations, such as an opinion letter or
direct dealings, see notes 60-65 and accompanying text supra.
112 Where duty is to be based on an argument of lawyer-client relationship, see E. F. Hutton & Co. v.
Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 391 (S.D. Texas 1969); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580
F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978) ("indicia" of relationship); MALLEN & LEvrr, supra note 5, at § 219. If the argu-
ment is duty to non-client, the prevailing approach is to treat the question as one of law, perhaps in terms of
scope of duty. See e.g., Ventura Humane Society v. Holloway, 40 Cal. App. 3d 897, 115 Cal. Rptr. 464
(1974); Adams v. Chenowith, 349 So.2d 230 (Fla. App. 1977); or more often without elaborate analysis,
supra note 88.
113 A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(2): Lawyer representing one party
generally should not communicate with the other party in a conflict situation. There is a strong but not
universal view that a divorce situation is always one of present conflict, Crystal, Ethical Problems in Marital
Practice, 30 S.C. L. REv. 321 (1979), the current New York view being that a lawyer cannot even with full
disclosure represent both parties. Id. at 325. The author's view is that such a view is "impractical and incon-
sistent with traditional notions of professionalism." Id. at 354-56. In New York, there ought to be a
presumption of duty where one lawyer deals with an unrepresented party. See Weigel v. Hardesty 549 P.2d
1335 (Colo. App. 1976), notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra; and Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal.
App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966) (where lawyer entered formally into lawyer-client relationship with
the wife, but acted as "scrivener" to the "client" under circumstances where it was likely his client was
really the husband); Young v. Hecht, 3 Kan. App. 2d 510, 597 P.2d 682 (1979) (good case for presumption,
but perhaps rebutted).
114 The extent of involvement in corporate matters by management and inside directors would
presumably give a basis forjustifiable reliance. Collins v. Fitzwater, 227 Or. 401, 560 P.2d 1074 (1977). See
also note 110 supra; Chalpin v. Brennan, 114 Ariz. 124, 559 P.2d 680 (1976).
115 See Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 31 A.2d 312 (1943) (outstanding example of injustice of what
seems a presumption against plaintiff); Adams v. Chenowith, 349 So.2d 231 (Fla. App. 1977) (the language
of a similar but irrebuttable presumption); Drawdy v. Sapp, 365 So.2d 461 (Fla. App. 1978) (relying on
Adams, although plaintiff was represented). If a lawyer can ethically represent both parties in non-conflict
land sale situations, then proof of such a situation might overcome the arm's-length assumption. See, e.g.,
Blevin v. Mayfield, 189 Cal. App. 2d 649, 11 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1961); Busey v. Perkings, 168 Md. 19, 176 A.
474 (1935); Kreis v. Black, 75 A.2d 523 (D.C. App. 1950). If thejurisdiction would prohibit joint represen-
tation, see, e.g., In Re Kemp, 40 NJ. 558, 194 A.2d 236 (1963), then evidence of dealing with the non-client
might raise a presumption of a duty relationship, as opposed to the approach ofAdas which used the ethical
prohibition to say a duty relationship could not exist.
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tion and discuss it with the parties with whom he is involved. Thus also can his
burden of enlightened decision be passed to others.
V. Conclusion
The courts are now well along in the first stage of establishing lawyers'
responsibility beyond their formal clients. We have charted the judicial
mechanism in analytical detail to show the situation-by-situation carving out of
the special relationships which impose the encumbrance of the duty of due
care. The will-drafting and opinion letter situations along with their close
analogues establish the minimum duties for the future. Our exploration of
other situations in which lawyers choose to influence situational interests for
multiple parties projects duties beyond the minimum.
The judicial mechanism proves to be complex and operates at several
levels. The top level establishes complete control for the future in the appellate
courts. Foreseeability, the hallmark of negligence theory, is indispensable yet
only one of several criteria. While the mechanism allows a balancing of
conflicting interests in a discretionary fashion, it is now well established that
there is no threat of excessive liability. Even when the situation imposes a duty,
the scope of duty is tightly circumscribed through a careful balancing wherein
the interest of the lawyer-client relationship weighs heavily.
On a deeper level, a key consideration is the lawyer's conscious undertak-
ing to act at the direction or on behalf of the client to benefit or influence
another party. When the lawyer thus acts to create a dependency or a reliance,
the second relationship may outweigh the lawyer-client relationship which
fostered it. Cumulatively, these added duties create a new enterprise liability of
a yet limited kind. Lawyers may choose to bear these risks economically, or
avoid them by careful stipulation of the risks which the other parties must bear.
In this fashion, the courts merely call for at least a minimal level of professional
competence and fair dealing with persons whose interests lawyers impact every
bit as much as if they were clients. How far courts will go in setting these new
legal standards depends on their willingness to scrutinize their own yet deeply
rooted assumptions about the roles lawyers in fact adopt-or should adopt.
While the enterprise of lawyering is in many respects unique, it is part of a
larger cumulation of activities. The judicial response to the economic risks of
the lawyering enterprise and the allocation of those risks is of a crucible sort.
The precedents thus established have provided a base for the careful and
restrained definition of the economic risks which other activities may
reasonably bear. In this fashion, the courts continue in a manner now well
recognized in the process of tort law. The process is not one of paternalism, but
judicious intervention to attempt to provide at least a rough form of economic
fairness. No enterprise should be a legal island.
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